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Safety management of technical equipment is not possible without risk assessment. Therefore, many standards are available for risk 
assessment, e.g. ISO 13824:2009 General principles on risk assessment of systems involving structures or ISO/IEC 31010:2009 
Risk management – Risk Assessment Techniques. In different industrial sectors risk assessment is fundamental step to determine 
required safety integrity level (SIL), eventually performance level (PL), which guarantees risk linked to some equipment on ac-
ceptable level. Standards applied for risk management based on SIL in different industrial sectors differ in methods used for risk 
evaluation and SIL determination. IEC 61508-5 accepts the use of qualitative, semi-quantitative or quantitative approach for 
risk evaluation and SIL determination. The standard uses hazardous event severity matrix as an example of qualitative approach 
for SIL determination, the standard furthermore uses layer of protection analysis (LOPA) as an example of semi-quantitative ap-
proach. The standard also uses Risk graph method as an example of both qualitative and semi-quantitative approach. IEC 62061 
only presents one semi-quantitative approach for risk evaluation and SIL determination based on combination of probability and 
severity of consequences. This approach is different from the approach presented in IEC 61508-5. Similarly ISO 13849-1 recom-
mends the use of qualitative method combining probability and severity of consequences for risk evaluation and PL determination, 
however, distinctly from IEC 61508-5 as well as IEC 62061. All these standards evaluate risk in the first step and in the second 
step they set safety systems reliability requirements, which should lower risk onto an acceptable level. The elemental question is, 
how exactly these standards evaluate risk in their methods. Another question is what acceptable level of risk is implicitly hidden 
in their requirements for choice of SIL and PL. This paper addresses these questions.
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Zarządzanie bezpieczeństwem urządzeń technicznych nie jest możliwe bez oceny ryzyka. Dlatego też istnieje wiele norm związa-
nych z oceną ryzyka, np. ISO 13824:2009 Ogólne zasady dotyczące oceny ryzyka w systemach obejmujących konstrukcje lub ISO/
IEC 31010:2009 Zarządzanie ryzykiem - Techniki oceny ryzyka. W różnych gałęziach przemysłu ocena ryzyka jest podstawowym 
krokiem na drodze do określenia wymaganego poziomu nienaruszalności bezpieczeństwa (SIL), oraz ewentualnie poziomu wy-
dajności (PL), który gwarantuje, że ryzyko w odniesieniu do niektórych urządzeń pozostanie na akceptowalnym poziomie. Normy 
stosowane w zakresie zarządzania ryzykiem w oparciu o SIL w różnych gałęziach przemysłu różnią się jeśli chodzi o metody 
stosowane do oceny ryzyka i określenia SIL. IEC 61508-5 akceptuje zastosowanie jakościowego, pół-ilościowego lub ilościowego 
podejścia do oceny ryzyka oraz określenia SIL. Norma ta wykorzystuje macierz ciężkości zdarzeń niebezpiecznych jako przykład 
podejścia jakościowego do określenia SIL; ponadto, norma wykorzystuje analizę warstw zabezpieczeń (LOPA) jako przykład 
podejścia półilościowego. Norma wykorzystuje również metodę wykresu ryzyka jako przykład podejścia zarówno jakościowego 
jak i półilościowego. IEC 62061 prezentuje jedno pół-ilościowe podejście do oceny ryzyka i określenia SIL łącząc prawdopo-
dobieństwo i ciężkość następstw. To podejście różni się od metody stosowanej w IEC 61508-5. Podobnie ISO 13849-1 zaleca 
stosowanie metody jakościowej łączącej prawdopodobieństwo i ciężkość następstw dla oceny ryzyka i określenia PL, jednak w 
sposób odmienny od IEC 61508-5 oraz IEC 62061. Wszystkie powyższe normy dokonują oceny ryzyka w pierwszym etapie zaś 
w drugim etapie ustalają one wymagania odnośnie niezawodności systemów bezpieczeństwa, które powinny obniżyć ryzyko do 
akceptowalnego poziomu. Podstawowym pytaniem jest jak dokładnie powyższe normy dokonują oceny ryzyka przy użyciu swoich 
metod. Inną kwestią jest to, jaki dopuszczalny poziom ryzyka jest domyślnie ukryty w ramach ich wymagań dotyczących wyboru 
SIL i PL. Niniejszy artykuł odnosi się do powyższych zagadnień.
Słowa kluczoewe: bezpieczeństwo, określenie SIL i PL, ocena ryzyka, dopuszczalny poziom ryzyka.
1. Introduction
For effective risk management it is necessary to be able to assess 
the risk accordingly. Risk assessment in technical practice becomes 
one of the fundamental elements to prove that a piece of equipment 
is sufficiently safe. This can be furthermore seen in standards in vari-
ous industrial sectors. These standards require risk assessment for 
equipment or a device and prove the risk is acceptable. The standards 
then offer different approach for risk evaluation; qualitative, semi-
quantitative and quantitative. These standards do not generally pro-
vide specific instructions on how to proceed while assessing risk for 
individual cases. The standards only provide generic recommenda-
tions with respect to variety of unsafe events and their consequences. 
When standards these generic cases specify more in depth by using 
examples, they do so in the form of appendices listed as informative, 
hence non-obligatory.
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Fundamental standards of functional safety are IEC 61508-5 [1] 
and IEC 61511-x [2]. Principles from these two have been adopted in 
various industrial sectors related to functional safety, i.e. IEC 62061 
[3], ISO 13849-1 [4], IEC 61513 [5], EN 50129 [6] and more. These 
listed standards are the result of historical development of understand-
ing the function of safety systems for reducing the risk resulting from 
operating technical equipment. When the requirements are laid down 
in the standards need to be applied to a specific technical solution it 
is necessary to appropriately understand the essence of risk and its 
evaluation. Examples of risk evaluation given in standards cannot be 
then carelessly applied. This could lead to underestimating or over-
estimating of the risk level and as a result safety management would 
be ineffective.
This article presents the analysis of simplified approaches to 
determining safety integrity from three international standards 
IEC 61508-5, IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1. The purpose of this article 
is to point out some common solutions and weaknesses of risk evalua-
tion as well as assessing its acceptability for using these standards. 
2. Risk and safety integrity according to specified stan-
dards
2.1. Risk and SIL according to IEC 61508-5
IEC 61508-5 Annex E (informative) stand-
ard provides a quantitative method to determine 
SIL titled Risk Graph Method (Fig. 1).
This simplified procedure is based on the 
following equation
            R = (f) of a specified (C) (1)
and assumptions C1 < C2 < C3 < C4;  F1 < F2;  P1 
< P2;  W1 < W2 < W3.
where
R  is the risk with no safety-related  
systems in place;
f  is the frequency of the hazardous 
event with no safety-related systems 
in place;
C  is the consequence of the hazardous 
event (the consequences could be 
related to harm associated with health 
and safety or harm from environmental 
damage).
This produces the following four risk pa-
rameters:
consequence of the hazardous event ( – C);
frequency of, and exposure time in, the  –
hazardous zone (F);
possibility of failing to avoid the hazard- –
ous event (P);
probability of the unwanted occurrence  –
(W).
Safety integrity level (SIL) of safety-related 
system is specified against intolerable risk by 
the target failure measures presented in Ta-
ble 1.
2.2. Risk and SIL according to IEC 61508-5
IEC 62061 Annex A (informative) provides a semi-quantitative 
method for determining SIL. This method is based on risk matrix (Fig. 
2) [7]. 
This simplified procedure is based on the following equation:
                 R = (Cl) of a specified (Se) (2)
Table 1. Safety integrity levels according to IEC 61508-5 – target failure mea-
sures for a safety function
Safety integ-
rity level (SIL)
Average probability of 
a dangerous failure on 
demand of the safety func-
tion [1] (PFDavg)
Average frequency of a 
dangerous failure of the 
safety function [h-1]
(PFH)
4 >1E-5 to <1E-4 >1E-9 to <1E-8
3 >1E-4 to <1E-3 >1E-8 to <1E-7
2 >1E-3 to <1E-2 >1E-7 to <1E-6
1 >1E-2 to <1E-1 >1E-6 to <1E-5
Fig. 1. The risk elements evaluation and SIL requirements determination according to IEC 61508 5
Fig. 2. The risk elements evaluation and SIL requirements determination according to IEC 62061
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where
R is the risk with no safety-related systems in place;
Cl  is the frequency of the hazardous event with no safety-
related systems in place;
Se  is the severity of consequence of the hazardous event (the 
consequences could be related to harm associated with 
health and safety).
This produces the following four risk parameters:
consequence of the hazardous event ( – Se);
frequency and duration of  exposure to hazard ( – Fr);
prevention possibilities ( – Av);
occurrence probability of the hazard ous situation ( – Pr).
Safety integrity levels (SILs) of safety function according to 
IEC 62061 are different from SILs according to IEC 61508-5 and its 
target failure measures are presented in Table 2.
2.3. Risk and PL according to ISO 13849-1
ISO 13849-1 similarly as IEC 61508-5 in Annex A (informative) 
uses qualitative method based on risk graph to evaluate safety integ-
rity, see Figure 3 [7]. With the only difference that for safety integrity 
of safety function the term performance level (PL) is being used.
This simplified procedure is based on the following equation:
 R = (X) of a specified (S) (3)
where
R  is the risk with no safety-related systems in place;
X  is the frequency of the hazardous event with no   
safety-related systems in place;
S  is the severity of consequence of the hazardous   
event (injury).
This produces the following three risk parameters:
severity of injury ( – S);
frequency and/or duration of  exposure to hazard ( – F);
possibility of avoiding or limiting harm ( – P).
Performance level (PL) of safety function according to 
ISO 13849-1 and its target failure measures are presented in Table 3.
3. Correctness of risk evaluation and safety integrity 
level
3.1. Fundamental consideration of the problem addressed
Risk evaluation is linked with aleatoric uncertainty and epistemic 
uncertainty. Aleatoric uncertainties are given by natural randomness 
in the behaviour of the investigated subject. Epistemic uncertainties 
come from lacking knowledge of the investigated subject. The use 
of simplified methods then only has meaning 
if simplification does not radically increase 
epistemic uncertainties. Furthermore, only if 
epistemic uncertainty from knowledge of the 
subject’s risk is not amplified by epistemic un-
certainty of simplified risk evaluation.
The main purpose of this study is to find 
out to what extent is risk evaluation appropriate 
where simplified methods have been used. The 
result of this investigation is then better rec-
ognition of regularities valid for using simpli-
fied risk evaluation methods, hence lowering 
epistemic uncertainties associated with these 
methods.
Assessment is carried out for approach-
es given in IEC 61508-5, IEC 62061 and 
ISO 13849-1 and described in chapter 2. Their 
common designator is that they express the 
risk by the product of probabilities and conse-
quences. Several parameters are used for it, see 
table 4.
It would seem that the approach accord-
ing to ISO 13849-1 is different because it con-
tains the probability (frequency) of undesirable 
event on an object which is a source of risk. The 
contradiction is only apparent. Approach according to IEC 61508-5, 
IEC 62061 assumes random occurrence of hazardous events in time, 
while ISO 13849-1 assumes the risk is permanent. The difference in 
approach is evident from Figure 4. In the end, both approaches evalu-
ate risk as the product of probabilities and consequences, and deter-
mine the safety integrity level as a measure of risk reduction. 
It is evident that for the quantitative risk evaluation the probability 
of consequence of undesirable events is given by the product of proba-
Fig. 3. The risk elements evaluation and PL requirements determination according to ISO 13849-1
Table 3. Safety integrity levels according to ISO 13849-1 – target failure mea-
sures for a safety function
Performance level (PL) Average probability of a dangerous failure 
per hour [h-1]
a >1E-5 to <1E-4
b >3E-6 to <1E-5
c >1E-6 to <3E-6
d >1E-7 to <1E-6
e >1E-8 to <1E-7
Table 2. Safety integrity levels according to IEC 62061 – target failure mea-
sures for a safety function
Safety integrity level (SIL) Probability of a dangerous failures per hour 
[h-1]
3 >1E-8 to <1E-7
2 >1E-7 to <1E-6
1 >1E-6 to <1E-5
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bility parameters and consequences. Thus, mul-
tiplying the values of all parameters takes place. 
If the values of these parameters are known, it is 
possible to evaluate the risk exactly. 
The actual parameter values are not used 
when using the simplified approaches. Param-
eters are separated into zones. I instead of using 
the actual values, verbal (qualitative) evalua-
tion or relative (semi-quantitative) evaluation 
expressed for example in points is used in these 
zones. Based on the given set of rules, see 
chapter 2, risk is then evaluated and assigned 
to safety integrity level. These features are 
common for selected standards IEC 61508-5, 
IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1. Differences lie 
only in the evaluation parameters and rules 
used. Therefore, the investigation is focused 
on what impact on correctness lies within the 
choice of evaluation parameters and rules used 
for risk evaluation.
3.2. The assessment of the correct-
ness of the simplified approach to 
IEC 61508-5
The method of determining safety integrity 
level (SIL) is based on a qualitative risk evalu-
ation. Zones of parameters C, F, P and W and 
their ranges are assigned with verbal descrip-
tion. According to the description, parameter zones C, F and P can be 
seen as arranged in a sequence complied by a geometric scale without 
a specified quotient. For parameter W can be assumed that its scale 
is prepared according to geometric sequence with an unknown quo-
tient.
If the simplified approach is correct, the results must match the 
results obtained when using fully quantitative risk evaluation. Each 
level of functional safety (-, a, 1, 2, 3, 4, b) is covered by successive 
risk intervals. With the appropriate set of parameter zones C, F, P and 
W, they should not overlap, see Figure 5.
Assessing the correctness of the simplified 
approach was based on examining whether the 
zone parameters C, F, P and W could be set so 
there was clear risk coverage through the SIL. 
Hence, inequality must then apply:
R < Ra < R1 < R2 < R3 < R4 < Rb       (4)
If the inequality is not satisfied, risk is then 
overlapped by two or more SIL and simplified 
approach cannot be considered as correct. 
Using simulation in Matlab results were 
found for all combinations of integers in the 
range <2; 20> quotients scales with geometric 
sequence of parameters C, F, P and W. Total 
number of 194 = 130 321 possibilities were ex-
amined in accordance with the simplified ap-
proach. The observed number of overlaps of 
two or more SIL is shown in Table 5 and Fig-
ure 6. 
If the simplified risk evaluation method 
was as good as the exact quantitative meth-
od, column “0” in Table 5 would have value 
130 321. The distribution of non-zero values 
and their size suggests how sensitive is the sim-
plified method for accurate estimation of the C, 
F, P and W parameters. When possible risk es-
timates were generated, “brutal” combinations 
Fig. 5. Risk covered by SIL
Table 4. Risk evaluation parameters according to IEC 61508-5, IEC 62061 and 
ISO 13849-1
Standard
Probability parameters Conse-
quence pa-
rameterOccurrence Exposure Avoidance
IEC 61508-5 W F P C
IEC 62061 Pr Fr Av Se
ISO 13849-1 – F P S
Fig. 4. The difference in dangerous situations
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were also generated; these would not be used 
in a real application of the simplified method. 
These “brutal” combinations are represented for 
example by value 5 297 quotients combinations 
where the overlap goes over six SIL categories. 
Yet it is clear from the presented results that the 
simplified approach leads to significant inaccu-
racies in risk evaluation and SIL determination. 
Each combination of the C, F, P and W param-
eters determined SIL incorrectly, see value 0 in 
column “0” in Table 5. It cannot therefore be 
considered as correct.  
3.3. The assessment of the correctness 
of the simplified approach accor-
ding to IEC 62061
The method of determining safety integrity 
level (SIL) in this standard is different from the 
method specified in IEC 61585. It is based on semi-quantitative risk 
evaluation. It uses four parameters (Se, Fr, Pr and Av), which are as-
sessed by points and reflected in the risk matrix where SIL determina-
tion takes place. Given that the score of probability parameters Fr, Pr 
and Av sums into a single endpoint parameter Cl, the use of geometric 
scales with the same quotient Q is apparent. 
Thus the sum arises from this relationship.
                 QFr ∙ QPr ∙ QAv = QFr + Pr + Av (5)
It represents the scales only on two levels, 
it is unnecessary to examine the scale composi-
tion (whether it is arithmetic or geometric) and 
can be considered as a scale drawn up in accord-
ance with geometric sequence with an unknown 
quotient. 
Again, as for IEC 6158-5, if the simplified 
approach is correct, the results must be consist-
ent with the results obtained when using the 
fully quantitative risk evaluation. Each level of 
functional safety (1, 2, 3) covers successive risk 
intervals. When the correct parameters zones are 
set for Se, Fr, Pr and Av, they should not over-
lap. Therefore, inequality must apply.
                            R1 < R2 < R3 (6)
If the inequality is not satisfied, the risk is 
then overlapped by two or more SIL and the 
simplified approach cannot be considered as 
correct.
Results were found for all combinations of 
integers in the range <2; 20> quotients scales 
with geometric sequence parameters Se, Fr, Pr 
and Av by doing a simulation in Matlab. How-
ever, since parameters Fr, Pr and Av must always have the identical 
quotient, the possible number of quotients combinations is 192 = 361. 
This is the total number of examined options for the simplified ap-
proach of risk evaluation. The observed number of overlaps is shown 
in Table 6 and Figure 7. 
It can be clearly seen that even this simplified approach leads to 
significant inaccuracies in evaluating risk and determining SIL. Each 
combination of the Se, Fr, Pr and Av parameters determined SIL in-
correctly, see value 0 in column “0” in Table 6. It cannot therefore be 
considered as correct.
3.4. The assessment of the correctness of the simplified 
approach according to ISO 13849-1 
Similarly to IEC 61508-5 the method for determining safety in-
tegrity level (PL) is in this standard is based on qualitative risk evalu-
Table 6. Number of overlaps (IEC 62061)
Overlap range
Number of couples of SIL category 
which overlap
0 1 2 3
One (next) SIL category 0 11 15 335
Two SIL categories 4 79 278 0
Three SIL categories 298 63 0 0
Fig. 6. Graph of overlap proportion (IEC 61508-5)
Table 5.  Number of overlaps (IEC 61508-5)
Overlap range
Number of couples of SIL category which overlap
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
One (next) SIL category 0 0 0 14 82 2 114 128 111
Two SIL categories 2 169 16 107 26 263 27 773 6 007 0
Three SIL categories 2 995 4 695 50 819 57 508 14 304 0 0
Four SIL categories 58 236 14 490 41 143 16 452 0 0 0
Five SIL categories 108 870 0 21 451 0 0 0 0
Six SIL categories 124 922 5 399 0 0 0 0 0
Fig. 7: Graph of overlap proportion (IEC 62061) 
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ation. It only uses three parameters. Parameter zones S, F and P and 
their scope are assigned with verbal description. Given that the scales 
only have two levels, it is then unnecessary to examine their com-
position (whether it is arithmetic or geometric) and can be regarded 
as scales based on geometric sequence with an unknown quotient. 
Again, as in IEC 61508-5, if the simplified approach is correct, the re-
sults must be consistent with the results obtained when using the fully 
quantitative risk assessment. Each level of functional safety (a, b, c, 
d, e) is covered by successive risk intervals. When the correct param-
eters zones are set for S, F and P they should not overlap. Therefore, 
inequality must apply.
 Ra < Rb < Rc < Rd < Re (7)
If the inequality is not satisfied, the risk is then overlapped by 
two or more SIL and the simplified approach cannot be considered 
as correct.
Results were obtained by doing a simulation in Matlab for all 
combinations of integers in the range <2; 20> quotients scales with 
geometric sequence parameters S, F and P.  In total 193 = 6 859 pos-
sible risk evaluation options were examined according to the simpli-
fied approach. The observed number of overlaps is shown in Table 7 
and Figure 8.
It can be clearly seen from the presented results that the simplified 
approach according to ISO 138491 is more robust than IEC 615085 
and IEC 62061 in terms of resistance to inappropriate composition of 
risk parameter scales. This fact can be also observed from the concen-
tration of values in column “0” in Table 7. Even this approach is not 
resistant against its improper use and it cannot be regarded as entirely 
correct.
4. Conclusion
IEC 61508 5, IEC 62061 and ISO 138491 standards do not indi-
cate any primary sources with references to the fundamental works in 
the discipline around risk. The standards generally recommend apply-
ing quantitative risk evaluation but for practical application they only 
offer informative guidelines for qualitative and semi-quantitative risk 
evaluation in the form of graphs or risk matrices, from these then arise 
the requirements for SIL. Without taking into account the nature of 
the subjects that are sources of the risk, applying these standards can 
result into a series of serious errors.
In particular, simplified approaches of risk evaluation presented in 
the informative annexes of IEC 615085 and IEC 62061 are highly de-
pendent on the correct understanding of the risks. They are very sensi-
tive to the methods of composition scales of risk parameters. Therefore, 
the risk evaluation of complex systems (power plants, chemical plants, 
railway vehicles, etc.) should apply simplified methods uniformly to 
all devices that make up the entire system. Correct SIL determination 
cannot be guaranteed for qualitative or semi-quantitative risk evalua-
tion of complex systems in accordance with those standards including 
ISO 13849-1. Fatal errors may occur; these can be partially eliminated 
by using a unified method for setting risk parameters (probability and 
consequence) for all suppliers of the equipment which then forms the 
complex system. This implies that the same range of scales should be 
used for all cases for assessing the probability and consequences. The 
risk of the equipment is in this case expressed implicitly. Tolerability 
of the risk is not clearly established. It is hidden. 
It is derived from the scales of probability and 
consequences; and the decision of which com-
bination of probability and consequences begins 
to apply the lowest SIL.
This problem does not occur when the fully 
quantitative risk evaluation is used. Uniformity 
of the method used for evaluation is guaranteed. 
If the level of tolerability of risk is set the same 
for all devices of the complex system, there are 
no contradictions in determining the required 
SIL. The risk is expressed explicitly when the 
quantitative method is used. It is clearly defined 
whether the risk of the equipment is tolerable 
or not. This is due to setting the threshold value 
of tolerability for individual and societal risks, 
potentially economic or environmental risks. 
The requirements for SIL are clearly specified 
to achieve tolerable levels of risk.
Fig. 8. Graph of overlap proportion (ISO 13849-1) 
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